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A Critique by Any Other Name:
Part 2 of Imagawa Ryōshun’s Nan Taiheiki
Jeremy A. SATHER
I have divided the translation of and commentary on Nan Taiheiki into two 
parts. In part one, I outlined the main concerns that influenced Ryōshun 
to write the text: the loyalty of the Imagawa to the ruling Ashikaga family, 
his frustration with Taiheiki (Chronicle of Great Peace), and his resentment 
toward Ashikaga Yoshimitsu. The overarching theme of Nan Taiheiki, then, 
is the protection of the Imagawa legacy. In part two, I continue my analysis 
of this theme through an examination of Ryōshun’s description of Hosokawa 
Kiyouji and his rebellion against the Ashikaga. Ryōshun’s father Norikuni 
proposed a plan to the shogun that would have sacrificed his son in an 
attempt to kill Kiyouji and nip his rebellion in the bud. I then examine the 
significance of the Kamakura outpost, its overlord the Kantō kubō, and his 
deputy the kanrei for both Kiyouji’s rebellion, which took place as a result 
of the strife surrounding the position of kanrei, and later, for Ryōshun’s 
participation in the Ōei Disturbance, which resulted from the discord 
between Kyoto and Kamakura. What Ryōshun likely perceived as similarities 
between his participation in the Ōei Disturbance and Kiyouji’s rebellion 
motivated him to include the Kiyouji episodes in Nan Taiheiki. Accordingly, 
Nan Taiheiki demonstrates, through Kiyouji, how easy it was to fall from 
grace, and, through the idealistic origins of the Kamakura outpost, just how 
far the Ashikaga had fallen under Yoshimitsu’s rule.
Keywords: Ashikaga Mitsukane, Ashikaga Ujimitsu, Hosokawa Kiyouji, 
Kanrei, Kubō, Imagawa Ryōshun, Nanbokuchō, Nan Taiheiki, Sasaki Dōyo, 
Taiheiki
Introduction
In Japan Review 29 I provided a translation of the first half of Imagawa Ryōshun’s 今川了俊 
(1326–1420?) Nan Taiheiki 難太平記 (Criticisms of Taiheiki), as well as an introduction to 
the text. Two primary concerns, I argued, motivated Ryōshun: first was his wish for Taiheiki 
太平記 to be amended to include his family, and second was his frustration toward the 
then retired shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 足利義満 (1358–1408). Criticizing Taiheiki was 
not Ryōshun’s main purpose, but rather a vehicle through which he might express these 
concerns. He dedicated much of the work to displaying his objectivity as an historian, the 
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better to show how favoritism influenced Taiheiki ’s writing. This was calculated to lend 
weight to his criticisms of Yoshimitsu.1
Here I provide the second portion of Nan Taiheiki, with an analysis of Ryōshun’s 
opinion on Hosokawa Kiyouji 細川清氏 (?–1362). Ryōshun describes two incidents. The 
first involves Ryōshun’s father Norikuni 今川範国 (1295–1384) putting forth a plan to the 
second shogun Ashikaga Yoshiakira 足利義詮 (1330–1367) to have Ryōshun kill Kiyouji 
when the latter was on the verge of revolt. The second incident concerns the matter of 
Kiyouji’s guilt or innocence in having ambitions to overthrow Yoshimitsu. Kiyouji, as 
shitsuji 執事, or shogunal deputy, was in a position of great power, being the interlocutor 
between the shugo daimyō 守護大名 and the shogun.2 Others around him, such as 
Hatakeyama Dōsei 畠山道誓 (?–1362) and Shiba Yoshimasa 斯波義将 (1350–1410), also 
sought to occupy the office of shitsuji; if we add that to the instability in the years following 
the death in 1358 of the first shogun Ashikaga Takauji 足利尊氏 (1305–1358), then the 
seriousness of the Kiyouji rebellion takes on added significance. Kiyouji’s innocence is the 
subject of the second episode.
But there was another issue at hand: the antipathy between the shogun in Kyoto and 
his counterpart in the east, the Kantō kubō 公方. Kamakura had been an integral part of the 
Ashikaga’s plan since the beginning of their march to power. For example, when Emperor 
Go-Daigo 後醍醐天皇 (1288–1339) sent Takauji to assault Kyoto and Takauji’s kinsman 
Nitta Yoshisada 新田義貞 (1301–1338) to Kamakura in 1333, Takauji knew how important 
it was to have a presence in Kamakura; his followers would not follow Yoshisada unless 
a family member was present, so he sent his one-year-old son Yoshiakira to accompany 
Yoshisada.3 Later, in 1336, after Takauji had rebelled against Go-Daigo, he left Yoshiakira, 
then four, in Kamakura in the care of three important individuals: Kiyouji, whose rebellion 
is the subject of the following analysis; Uesugi Noriaki 上杉憲顕 (1306–1368), who would 
become the kanrei to the Kantō kubō, and whose family would hold that post in perpetuity; 
and Shiba Ienaga 斯波家長 (1321–1338), the son of Shiba Takatsune 斯波高経 (1305–1367), 
who, like Kiyouji, fell prey to the scheming of Sasaki Dōyo 佐々木導誉 (1306–1373). 
Takauji understood quite well that by placing one of his family members in Kamakura he 
would both bolster the shogunate’s authority and provide a buffer against rebellions in the 
east and north. So it was that in 1349 he appointed his son Motouji 足利基氏 (1340–1367) 
Kantō kanrei.4
But like many of the best laid plans, this one went awry. Placing one’s family members 
in positions of power had the advantage of blood ties to prevent betrayal; however, such 
1 Sather 2016.
2 I use “shogunal deputy” as a rendering of kanrei 管領, shitsuji, and tandai 探題, all of whose incumbents took 
their authority from the shogun.
3 Yoshisada, being only a chieftain, held little sway outside his own house and so needed Takauji’s support to 
muster enough troops for the assault on Kamakura—thus Yoshiakira’s presence among his army. Naturally, 
Takauji saw the advantage in sending his son to assist, as everyone would know that despite Yoshisada’s 
nominal leadership it was in truth the Ashikaga’s power that made the assault possible. See part 2 in Minegishi 
2005.
4 This was the original term for what would later be known as the Kantō kubō. When the term kubō became 
widely adopted as a moniker for the shogun in Kyoto, the Ashikaga in Kamakura also became known as the 
Kantō kubō; meanwhile, the office of Kantō kanrei was transferred to Motouji’s kanrei, Uesugi Noriaki. The 
post was monopolized by the Uesugi thereafter.
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arrangements could be dangerous, for a disaffected family member often possessed enough 
prestige and power in his own right to present an alternative if enough people grew 
dissatisfied with the current regime. Indeed, this was the thinking that led the second and 
third kubō, Ashikaga Ujimitsu 足利氏満 (1359–1398) and his son Mitsukane 足利満兼 
(1378–1409), to rise up against Yoshimitsu, and Ryōshun to join them.5
Nan Taiheiki ’s account of Kiyouji’s rebellion and the backdrop against which it 
erupted—the struggle for power between the shogun and his counterpart in Kamakura—
are both integral to understanding Nan Taiheiki. Let us first take up the tale of Norikuni’s 
plan to murder Kiyouji, as it segues nicely into the broader arc of the conflict between Kyoto 
and Kamakura.
Murder, He Wrote: Imagawa Norikuni’s Plot to Murder Hosokawa Kiyouji 
Part one of Nan Taiheiki concludes with two episodes regarding Kiyouji’s rebellion, 
“Concerning Norikuni’s Desire to Kill Kiyouji Using Ryōshun” and “Concerning Kiyouji’s 
Ambition and Innocence Thereof.” In the former, Ryōshun describes how Taiheiki leaves 
out his father Norikuni’s secret plan to have Ryōshun murder Kiyouji, while the latter shows 
Ryōshun to be skeptical of claims that Kiyouji had any intent to rebel. Both episodes are 
also pertinent to our understanding of Ryōshun’s overall goals in Nan Taiheiki, but here I 
will take up the former. 
Kiyouji was like many high-born warlords of his time: brave in battle, stubborn when 
challenged, and covetous of lands and titles. He was one of the three men entrusted with 
Yoshiakira’s care when Takauji left Kamakura to fight against Nitta Yoshisada in 1336. 
He was a staunch supporter of Takauji, having fought alongside him against his younger 
brother Tadayoshi 足利直義 (1306–1352) in the Kannō Disturbance (1350–1352). Later, 
against Takauji’s outcast son Tadafuyu 足利直冬 (1327–1387), he was appointed personal 
guard to Emperor Go-Kōgon 後光厳 (1338–1374). He was the shugo 守護 of the provinces 
of Ise, Iga, and Wakasa, and served in the Ashikaga’s administration as a member of the 
judicial council (hyōjōshū 評定衆) and, like Ryōshun, as chief of the council of adjudicators 
(hikitsuke tōnin 引付当人). Kiyouji’s service was meritorious to the degree that he rose to 
the highest levels of government, becoming shitsuji in 1358. However, advancing beyond 
one’s station was fraught with peril, as Ryōshun rightly observes, and Kiyouji became the 
target of his peers’ resentment.6 Kiyouji was not innocent: according to Ryōshun he had 
few qualms about lying when it suited his purpose.7 In short, Kiyouji was a man of many 
accomplishments, but men of accomplishments rarely rise high in the world without making 
enemies, and he was no different in this regard.
But how did it get to the point where Kiyouji would be the target of murder? In brief, 
Kiyouji was the loser in a squabble with the aforementioned Sasaki Dōyo, and due to 
the latter’s machinations Kiyouji fell under Yoshiakira’s suspicion and, so it goes, had no 
choice but to rebel. Dōyo and Kiyouji were at odds over lands and other emoluments, using 
5 As I have argued, whether or not Ryōshun actually rebelled or not is up for debate. Thomas Conlan, for 
instance, leaves the debate up in the air, while Ogawa Takeo argues that Ryōshun played a principle role in 
the event. What does seem clear, however, is that at the very least Ryōshun raised troops. Sather 2015, pp. 58; 
Tyler, Conlan, and Uyenaka, 2016, pp. 223–31; Ogawa 2012, p 193.
6 Hasegawa 2008, p. 40.
7 Hasegawa 2008, p. 33.
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incidents such as Yoshiakira’s snubbing of Kiyouji’s Tanabata poetry contest (utaawase 歌合) 
for a gathering at Dōyo’s to illustrate the pettiness of the rivalry.8 That rivalry would take 
a turn for the worse when Kiyouji made a critical error: he took his child to Iwashimizu 
Hachiman shrine to perform his coming-of-age genpuku 元服 ceremony, naming the boy 
Hachiman Hachirō. Such a move could be interpreted as an attempt to usurp the Ashikaga’s 
authority, a fact that Dōyo seized upon as a perfect pretense to see his rival destroyed.9
At the heart of the matter was a ganjo 願書, or written prayer.10 According to Taiheiki 
it asked for Kiyouji’s descendants to rule the realm, for Yoshiakira to fall ill and die, and for 
Ashikaga Motouji to fall from grace.11 There were serious doubts as to whether the ganjo 
was authentic: both Ise Nyūdō, to whom Dōyo presented the prayer, as well as Ryōshun 
and his father were skeptical of the document’s authenticity. Nevertheless, such doubts were 
enough to arouse the shogun’s suspicions. Notwithstanding that Ryōshun corroborates 
at least the first of the three points in Nan Taiheiki, the seal on the prayer “was most 
certainly Kiyouji’s.” 12 Furthermore, Yoshiakira did indeed become ill, the malady clearing 
up following the revelation of the ganjo, a timely recovery that would have lent credence 
to the truth of the curse. Convinced that Kiyouji was at fault, Yoshiakira decided to have 
him killed. It was sometime before 1361.09.23, when Kiyouji fled to Wakasa Province, that 
Norikuni secretly presented his plan to Yoshiakira to have Kiyouji murdered and in doing 
so prevent rebellion.
Norikuni intended to leverage Ryōshun’s friendship with Kiyouji as a means of having 
the two meet in person, at which point Ryōshun would kill him. Ryōshun was not told 
of the plan in advance, however, and was left speechless (gongo dōdan 言語道断) when he 
found out. Interestingly, nowhere does Ryōshun suggest he would have countermanded his 
father’s wishes, and in fact seemed impressed by his father’s willingness to sacrifice a favored 
son for the sake of peace.13 Indeed, for Ryōshun, such a deed would have been seen as one 
of unparalleled loyalty to the Ashikaga that should go recorded. And yet he claims that 
Taiheiki says nothing of the incident but simply that “the shogun entered Imagumano.” 14 
In this he is correct, for no extant version of Taiheiki records the plan, and knowledge of it 
would be lost if not for Nan Taiheiki.
One riddle about the plot surrounding the ganjo remains unsolved: unlike Taiheiki, 
Ryōshun never claims outright the culprit was Dōyo.15 In order to understand why Ryōshun 
would refrain from directly implicating Dōyo, we must take into account Ryōshun’s 
position at the time of Nan Taiheiki’s writing. A political pariah, Ryōshun’s goal was to have 
Taiheiki amended, both to exculpate his participation in the Ōei Disturbance, and also to 
 8 Hasegawa 1998, pp. 235–37.
 9 Hasegawa 1998, p. 238.
10 While there has been some argument as to whether this document was real, that Ryōshun discusses it and 
that it found its way into Taiheiki strongly suggests that it was. For more, see Wada 2015, pp. 265–70.
11 Hasegawa 1998, p. 239.
12 Hasegawa 1998, p. 241; Hasegawa 2008, p. 31.
13 “It was only when I arrived in Kyoto that my father explained the situation, leaving me speechless.… My 
father believed his action to be a great service, and even though it is no secret that he thought to put an end to 
a matter of great significance by sacrificing one of his children, it is not recorded in the Taiheiki.” Hasegawa 
2008, pp. 31–32. 
14 Hasegawa 2008, p. 31.
15 Ryōshun refers instead to some unknown individual (aru hito 或人). See Hasegawa 2008, p. 33.
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warn his descendants against disloyalty against the Ashikaga. Moreover, while most versions 
of Taiheiki suggest that Kiyouji’s downfall was Dōyo’s fault, other versions of the tale exist 
in which the responsibility for the plot against the Ashikaga is laid at the feet of Kiyouji and 
Hatakeyama Dōsei. However, Taiheiki variants bearing this version of the tale were most 
likely rewritten to show favoritism to Dōyo.16 Evidence suggesting that Dōyo’s branch of 
the Sasaki family had some influence on Taiheiki’s narrative strengthens this notion.17 It 
stands to reason that if Ryōshun was seeking to have Taiheiki amended, he might have been 
hedging his bets, leaving Dōyo and the Sasaki family alone on account of their influence on 
Taiheiki.
And yet, why stir up suspicions at all if not to put feet to the fire? This question 
becomes all the more pertinent when we consider how strange it is that Ryōshun would 
defend Kiyouji even though he cheated Ryōshun out of lands.18 Ryōshun is careful to 
emphasize this, and to say that even so “he does not believe Kiyouji had rebellious intent.” It 
makes sense for him to defend a known rebel and thief only when we consider that Ryōshun 
was not simply trying to amend Taiheiki, but to establish his credentials as an historian. 
Ignoring Dōyo’s role in the events while defending Kiyouji allowed Ryōshun to demonstrate 
his ability to separate his personal concerns from his public ones. And for those clever 
enough to read between the lines, it would have been obvious that Ryōshun was speaking of 
Dōyo. 
In conclusion, Ryōshun brings up his father’s plan to murder Kiyouji both to highlight 
his objectivity and also to criticize Taiheiki for overlooking his father’s plan to prevent 
rebellion by sacrificing his son. Both also served to chip away at Taiheiki’s credibility, which 
he would need to do if he wanted the text to be amended. He would also need to avoid 
inflaming tensions with the Sasaki house, who had some modicum of control over the text, 
requiring him to avoid accusing Dōyo directly.
A Tale of Two Cities: The Conflict between Kyoto and Kamakura
Ryōshun’s description of the origin of the Kamakura outpost is critical to understanding 
the power struggle in which he became embroiled. After Go-Daigo’s defeat and flight to 
Yoshino in 1336, the Ashikaga moved the seat of the warrior government from Kamakura 
to Kyoto. The reasons for this are many, some of which are outlined in the Ashikaga’s first 
legal document, the Kenmu Formulary (Kenmu shikimoku 建武式目).19 Certainly, economic 
interests were central to the decision, as the capital was a center of commerce and trade.20 
However, proximity to the court was also a concern for the fledging warrior government, as 
16 Wada Takuma is a bit more cautious regarding Dōyo’s culpability, but I am inclined to go with Koakimoto’s 
explanation that the Sasaki, who are shown to have had an undue influence on later versions of Taiheiki, 
were in some part responsible for having it rewritten to downplay their role in Kiyouji’s downfall. Koakimoto 
2005, p. 117; Wada 2015, pp. 265–91.
17 Not all versions of Taiheiki are created equal. It is this fact that makes it such a difficult text to unravel. For 
instance, the Tenshōbon variant seems to prioritize the Sasaki family and its deeds, even while it posits Dōyo 
as the one responsible for Kiyouji’s destruction. The process by which variants were amended has been the 
subject of much debate among Japanese scholars. What we can say is that warriors were heavily interested in 
how they appeared in Taiheiki. Perhaps Dōyo and his descendants simply did not care that Taiheiki portrayed 
him as the one responsible for Kiyouji’s downfall. He was a court rebel, after all. Kami 1985, pp. 45–46.
18 Hasegawa 2008, p. 33.
19 For more on this document, see Grossberg 1981.
20 Harrington 1985, pp. 68–69.
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it afforded them necessary symbolic capital for their continued battle with Go-Daigo, who 
sought to direct his own sacerdotal authority against the Ashikaga. All in all, Kyoto was a 
smart choice for a new government wishing to rule without the burden of being compared 
to its predecessor and needing the f lexibility to break with its precedents, even while it 
sought to live up to its example.
Kamakura’s importance was never in question, however. Rebellious kinsmen 
and followers were common, perhaps nowhere more so than in the east, and since its 
establishment, Kamakura had acted as a sort of buffer between the warriors there and the 
central government in Kyoto. Tadayoshi and Yoshiakira were stationed there until Takauji’s 
fourth son Motouji was established as head of the outpost in 1349 under the title of Kantō 
kanrei. This title would later be transferred to the Uesugi family when Motouji’s son 
Ujimitsu began to be styled the Kantō kubō after the practice of referring to the shogun 
in Kyoto via that moniker. Whatever its name, the office was one of great influence and 
power, and while Motouji resisted the temptation to take up arms against Kyoto, his son 
and grandson were not so restrained. Following his death in 1367, Kyoto and Kamakura 
would be at odds, the eastern scions of the Ashikaga believing they had just as much claim 
to power as their western brethren.
The importance of the office of shitsuji/kanrei cannot be overstated. It was the most 
sought after office in government, and when Kiyouji was appointed shitsuji in 1358, he 
became the target of his peers’ machinations. The three powerful families that battled to 
fill it—the Hosokawa, Hatakeyama, and Shiba, collectively referred to as the san kanrei 
三管領—were involved in nearly all the major conflicts throughout the latter half of the 
fourteenth century. While Yoriyuki’s ascension in 1368 did indeed mark a less overtly 
volatile period, it in no way diminished the frequency of political intrigue, in large part 
because of this office. Indeed, Yoriyuki himself became the victim of intrigue, and in 1379 
was forced to abdicate his position in what is known as the Kōryaku Incident (Kōryaku no 
seihen 康暦の政変).21
The conf licts over the office of kanrei would have ramifications, both direct and 
indirect, on Ryōshun’s life. Indeed, his own flirtation with rebellion in the Ōei Disturbance 
was directly related to fighting between the shogun and Kyoto and his counterpart in 
Kamakura, both of whom had their own kanrei. Moreover, after Yoriyuki’s death in 1392, 
Shiba Yoshimasa saw to it that the Shibukawa, a family that had once held the position 
of Kyushu tandai 九州探題 (shogunal deputy for Kyushu), would reclaim the office at 
Ryōshun’s expense.22 That Ryōshun saw fit to bring this up at the end of Nan Taiheiki 
is a testament to how much it weighed on his mind, and how shameful he thought such 
intrigues to be.
21 Following Yoriyuki’s victory over his cousin Kiyouji and subsequent ascension to the office of kanrei in 1368, 
shugo daimyō such as Sasaki Dōyo, Shiba Takatsune and his son Yoshimasa, as well as the Yamana and Toki 
families, arrayed themselves against Yoriyuki. Certain failures in his policy or military maneuvering gave 
them opportunities to chip away at his authority, and after his younger brother Yoriharu failed to subdue a 
Southern court general in 1378, the voices speaking out against him grew louder. Just as Kō no Moronao and 
his brother Moroyasu surrounded Takauji and forced the shogun to acquiesce to their wishes to see Tadayoshi 
ousted from government on 1349.08.13, Dōyo’s son Takahide and Shiba Yoshimasa surrounded Yoshimitsu’s 
palace and demanded Yoriyuki’s dismissal. Yoshimasa subsequently became kanrei. For more on Moronao 
surrounding Takauji’s mansion, see Satō 1990, pp. 61–62; for Yoriyuki’s ouster, Satō 1990, pp. 137–38.
22 Kawazoe 1964, p. 212.
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Indirectly, the politicking surrounding the office of kanrei was such that Yoshimitsu 
could not help but be suspicious of anyone who had sufficient power and authority to 
challenge him. Ryōshun, it should be said, was one such individual. There is a tendency to 
see Yoshimitsu as a sort of villain, particularly in accounts by shugo daimyō such as Ryōshun 
who served him; however, we must also appreciate the difficulty of his position—that of 
lord of men whose modus operandi was to arrogate as much power and authority as possible, 
usually at each other’s expense. It was natural, then, for him to be suspicious of Kiyouji and 
Ryōshun, who were of collateral families of the Ashikaga and possessed of their own wealth 
and resources. In short, both fell victim not only to political machinations that directly 
impacted their lives, but also to the characteristics of the milieu in which they lived.
In any event, Ryōshun explains Takauji and Tadayoshi’s thinking regarding the 
establishment of the office of Kantō kanrei as wanting the Kamakura outpost and its 
chieftain to be stabilizing forces in the east, which would weld the warriors there to the 
shogun in Kyoto through ties of Ashikaga blood.23 It was risky, however, as the temptation 
was real for a powerful leader commanding the military might of the East and North to 
secede from Kyoto’s control. Indeed, this was not the first time the idea of creating an 
independent kingdom in the east had occurred; Taira no Masakado 平将門 (903–940) was 
an early precedent. The Ashikaga were clearly aware of the risk, for they tried to hammer 
home the point to young Motouji that the rulers of the Kantō should be “hereditary 
protectors of the shogun.” It was well that they did so, for Ryōshun explains that “though 
many often spoke their grudges against Yoshiakira to Motouji and urged him to rebel, he 
faithfully carried out the wishes of his father. . . . Motouji suppressed this desire out of fear 
that the realm would fall into turmoil.” 24
Still, such commitments rarely lasted beyond a generation or two, the personal ties that 
originally bound agreements fraying with the passage of time. We must remember that there 
were few other options available to the would-be hegemon aside from entrusting a family 
member with the authority to rule in one’s stead. It was either that or appoint someone 
with no blood ties whatsoever, a risky move at best given the well-established duplicity of 
shugo daimyō. Furthermore, it was a simple matter to retain control of Kantō following 
Go-Daigo’s defeat, as the relationship between Takauji and Tadayoshi was copacetic, with 
the latter providing an authoritative presence there. As the Ashikaga’s prominence became 
obvious, they could leave it in the hands of another such as Motouji without fear.25 It was 
only after the deaths of Takauji and Motouji that things took a turn for the worse.
The conflict between Kyoto and Kamakura continued well into the waning years of 
the Sengoku period (1477–1573). The desire of Kamakura’s Ashikaga overlords to remain 
independent would devolve into a conflict between the Kantō kubō and his kanrei, eventually 
leading to the Kyōtoku Disturbance 享徳の乱 of 1454, where the fifth Kantō kubō Ashikaga 
Shigeuji 足利成氏 (1438–1497) f led to Kōga in Shimōsa Province after assassinating his 
own kanrei, Uesugi Noritada 上杉範忠 (1408–1461?), an Ashikaga loyalist appointed by 
the eighth shogun Yoshimasa 足利義政 (1436–1490). Shigeuji would become known as the 
Kōga kubō, while the Ashikaga’s replacement, Masatomo 足利政知 (1435–1491), came to 
23 Hasegawa 2008, p. 39.
24 Hasegawa 2008, p. 39.
25 Watanabe 1995, p. 131.
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be known as the Horigoe kubō when the war with Shigeuji and the internecine struggles 
of the Uesugi clan prevented him from even arriving in Kamakura, obliging him instead 
to take up residence in Horigoe in Izu Province! Such was the ironic and bloody fate of the 
east, first set down by the Ashikaga brothers’ well-meaning decision to place Motouji in 
Kamakura in what would end up an empty hope of forging a lasting peace.
Conclusion
In part 2 of Nan Taiheiki I have chosen two sections that contribute to my conclusion that 
Ryōshun saw the work as both a corrective and a criticism. The tale of Kiyouji’s rebellion, 
Imagawa Norikuni’s plot to have him murdered, and the importance of the Kamakura 
outpost are noteworthy not simply because they are integral aspects of both Ryōshun’s 
life and his stance in Nan Taiheiki, but also because, more broadly, they highlight the 
precariousness of life in the fourteenth century. Hosokawa Kiyouji, the Yamana and Toki 
families, and even Ryōshun’s friend Hosokawa Yoriyuki, one of the major political forces 
of the latter half of the fourteenth century, were laid low on account of the whims of the 
shogun and the machinations of their peers. As is evident from Nan Taiheiki, skill, will, 
and not a little bit of luck were necessary to navigate the Scylla and Charybdis that was the 
political environment in which Ryōshun and his peers lived, an environment in which even 
the most powerful might be here one day, gone the next.
Translator’s Note
As in part one, I have relied primarily on the original Nan Taiheiki contained in the Gunsho 
ruijū, which contains no section titles or breaks of any kind, and Hasegawa Tadashi’s 
reprint and translation of Arai Hakuseki’s 新井白石 (1657–1725) Jōkyō sannenban version of 
Nan Taiheiki, which contains not only the section titles but also Arai’s annotations. I have 
used the latter only where the original exhibits ambiguities.26 My own divisions within the 
text—parts one, two, and three—are based on an understanding of the text indebted to 
Hakuseki and the interpretations of Hasegawa and Wada Takuma.27 Any and all errors are 
my own.
Other resources include an online facsimile of the Gunsho ruijū Nan Taiheiki by 
Hanafusa Tomokazu that provided a useful comparison where there are slight discrepancies 
between the two texts, usually regarding place names.28 Thomas D. Conlan has also recently 
published an English translation of Nan Taiheiki.29 My translation had been finished for 
some time and both were in press simultaneously, so I have not relied on it as a comparative 
tool.
Regarding names, it was common in medieval Japan to refer to individuals by their 
court titles, Buddhist appellations, or the location of their domiciles. Ryōshun, for instance, 
is sometimes called Sadayo in the text, but I have chosen to use the former, as it is the name 
26 Extant versions of Nan Taiheiki include the Sonkeikaku bunkobon 尊経閣文庫本, the Tanimura bunkobon 
谷村文庫本, and the Tawa bunkobon 多和文庫本.
27 Wada 2015.
28 Hasegawa 2006; Hasegawa 2008; Hanafusa 2009. Alternatively, Nan Taiheiki is located in book 938 of 
Gunsho ruijū, in the “Battles” section (kassenbu 合戦部).
29 Tyler, Conlan, and Uyenaka 2016, pp. 223–60. 
A Critique by Any Other Name: Part 2
33
by which he is most commonly known. I refer to all individuals by their actual names as 
opposed to their titles, footnoting the latter. Additionally, for powerful individuals such as 
Ashikaga Takauji and his brother Tadayoshi, I have opted to apply the title “Lord” to their 
names to preserve the respect with which Ryōshun addresses them in the text.
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Nan Taiheiki or Criticisms of Taiheiki
Part Three
Concerning the Rebellion of the Kamakura Kanrei Ujimitsu
Lord Ujimitsu lamented that “Because Lord Yoshimitsu’s government was biased toward 
certain people, some powerful individual might in the end appear and steal the realm 
from the Ashikaga; would it not be better [to have it taken by someone in the family] than 
some unrelated individual?” “Rebellion for the sake of the people” is a widely-accepted 
notion, so had the shogun changed his mind entirely—even had he not focused wholly 
on good government—why would such thoughts have occurred to Lord Ujimitsu if Lord 
Yoshimitsu had but ceased his recent evils and unprincipled deeds and worked toward 
dispelling the grievances of the people? Lately everyone seems to speak of some grudge 
against Lord Yoshimitsu, yet his destiny is strong and his authority is absolute. Thus, if his 
administration were even slightly correct, who indeed would join their hearts with Lord 
Ujimitsu?
Out of fear, Lord Yoshimitsu even now commonly performs prayers, and it is rumored 
that maledictions for the subjugation of the Kantō are being performed. It seems to me that 
if he would do away with prayers and sorcery and concentrate even a little on how to govern 
properly, he would immediately come to know the way of heaven and the hearts of the gods 
and Buddhas.
Is this not true even for warfare? Thinking of this in terms of the triad of Heaven, 
Earth, and Man, the advantage of Heaven resides in dates and timing, auspicious directions, 
and the nature of an individual by birth. Is not the advantage of Heaven simply using what 
is beneficial? The advantage of Earth is nothing more than placing impregnable mountains, 
seas, and other defensible areas in front of you, and fortifying oneself in a good stronghold. 
The advantage of Man is reason.30 In accordance with the saying, “If the hearts of all 
people are in harmony with reason, then the advantages of Heaven and Earth will become 
unnecessary,” if all the people of Japan give thanks for the blessings of their lord with one 
heart, then would even one villain be born? Then Lord Yoshimitsu’s prayers would be 
answered naturally. In the event that his mind is filled with evil and immorality, if he is of 
the mind to dispel them through prayer, it will not matter what secret rites he performs: his 
prayers will go unanswered.
Concerning the Details of Ryōshun’s Forced Resignation
from the Office of Tandai and Subsequent Retirement
When Ōuchi Yoshihiro attacked Izumi, I harbored no ambitions, nor did I communicate 
with or receive any letter from the Kantō. It was likely Ōuchi himself who said [that I had]. 
A communiqué had been sent to me just as it had to others, and [upon receiving it] I ought 
to have immediately protested my innocence to Lord Yoshimitsu. Though I was in no way 
insincere, someone must have told him that I was late to Kyoto because my children and 
retainers in Tōtōmi were sympathetic to the Kantō. I heard whispers that he suspected me 
of treachery, and that I was to be sent off to Kyushu by pirate ship. I feared it was nothing 
30 Ryōshun uses the word ri or kotowari 理, which means logic or reason. This is similar to dōri 道理, or reason, 
as defined by Ikegami 1997, pp. 86–90.
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but a pretext to get rid of me,31 and that malefactors in Kyushu likely plotted [against me] 
and spoke to Lord Yoshimitsu, referring to precedents, to rescind the communiqués and 
directives I had received and send me home.32
I received three or four communiqués urging me only to “do my duty,” but even so, 
Lord Yoshimitsu’s doubts continued to grow, so I thought it better to retire to my province 
and for the time being entrust the fate of my children to him. And if until the end he still 
would not spare me, then Lord Ujimitsu might have preserved the fortunes of the Ashikaga 
in perpetuity and brought stability to the people (banmin ando 万民安堵).
Previously, when Lord Tadayoshi and Lord Takauji’s relationship soured, the people 
of the realm could not choose between them and followed either as they pleased. People 
at that time believed that it would be difficult to dispense with Lord Tadayoshi, for he 
was not corrupt in the least; nor was Lord Takauji, as military shogun, given to private 
concerns, and so he too was impossible to dispense with. Lord Tadayoshi was a man of deep 
compassion and so willingly transferred the realm and chieftainship to his brother after 
the Battle of Hakone Mountain during the Nakasendai Disturbance. Lord Takauji never 
forgot this, and, wanting to affect a smooth transfer of power to his son Yoshiakira, did not 
condemn Lord Tadayoshi for killing Moronao and Moroyasu at the Battle of Ide in Settsu 
Province, nor did he condemn him when Uesugi Noriaki fled Izu Mountain after the Battle 
of Yuiyama. The brothers were completely reconciled.33
The brothers may have had some secret agreement, without which it would have been 
difficult to maintain peace, for they could not be swayed no matter what Lord Yoshiakira 
said. Even if the administration of government were mismanaged in the least, the shogun 
would be able to protect all of Japan were he but to unify the lords of the Kantō. Moreover, 
there was a secret pact with Lord Tadayoshi that they would choose someone from among 
Lord Yoshiakira’s brothers as Lord of Kamakura. They ceded the Kantō to Lord Motouji, 
who was told repeatedly that his children and grandchildren should be hereditary protectors 
of the shogun.
Later, after the Ashikaga brothers had passed away, though many often spoke of their 
grudges against Lord Yoshiakira to Lord Motouji and urged him to rebel, he faithfully 
carried out the wishes of his father. Lord Yoshiakira may have feared Kamakura would seek 
independence as Lord Tadayoshi had wished, but Lord Motouji suppressed this desire out 
of fear that the realm would fall into turmoil. I hear that he made various oaths to the kami 
and passed away before Lord Yoshiakira, but the truth of the matter remains unknown.
As for recent events, when I went to Tōtōmi I decided only to look to someone from 
among the Ashikaga who I believed would pursue correct government, since this was 
Takauji’s wish.34 But around the time when it became clear to me that Kyoto would send a 
force to subdue me, I heard that Uesugi [Norisada] strongly urged Lord Mitsukane to make 
peace with Lord Yoshimitsu. I knew then and there that Lord Mitsukane did not think to 
31 Kokoro no oni 心の鬼, literally “demons of the heart.” This phrase was used to indicate apprehension or worry, 
indicating that such emotions were likely the result of the intrusion of some outside influence. Hasegawa 
2008, p. 42, note 57.
32 Neither Hanafusa nor Hasegawa attempt to clarify what “precedents” (onkojitsu 御故実) Ryōshun refers to here.
33 A reconciliation that would not last long, for Tadayoshi would be slain, most likely poisoned, while in 
Kamakura, marking the end of the Kannō Disturbance.
34 “Recent events” refers to Ujimitsu and Mitsukane’s rebellion in the Kantō.
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revolt for the sake of the realm, and so, respectful of Kyoto’s judgment, I retired of my own 
volition to Fujisawa and stayed there, thinking that my children should be of assistance to 
Lord Yoshimitsu and Lord Mitsukane. But even after the reconciliation, Lord Yoshimitsu and 
Norisada must have thought that I, being in Fujisawa, continued to urge Lord Mitsukane 
to rebel. Once they were reconciled, both Kyoto and the Kantō decided that there was to 
be no distinction between a daimyo’s hereditary lands or delegated lands, so I was free to 
retire to whichever I preferred.35 I told Norisada repeatedly that I preferred my province, 
and so returned once again [to Suruga]. However, I heard that Lord Mitsukane told Lord 
Yoshimitsu that my fate was at his discretion, and that he, Mitsukane, was prepared to deal 
with me if necessary. Though I thought it inconvenient, I was grateful for the dispensation 
and traveled to the capital because Lord Yoshimitsu had often indicated that he would spare 
my life because of my past service if I would but present myself to him in person.36
When I consider the entirety of the situation, I exerted myself in vain because I 
foolishly thought of past connections and duty. How I lament having wasted the honor and 
wealth I accrued over long years. The truth about my sojourn to Kyushu is simply that I did 
not know my place. Though I was not necessarily as favored by or as close as others to Lord 
Yoshimitsu, I put my own concerns aside entirely and, having been ordered above all to 
pacify the West, entrusted myself to that decision, all because I thought only to do my duty 
for the Ashikaga. Not in their wildest dreams did my followers think that I would lead them 
to their deaths, lose my honor, or now even my hereditary lands. Men ought to perform 
loyal service according to their rank, for others will become resentful of those who perform 
service beyond their station.
Concerning Ōuchi Yoshihiro’s Rebellion and His Attempt at Allying with Ryōshun
When Ōtomo Chikayo returned to his province, Ōuchi Yoshihiro came to me in secret 
and said: “From beginning to end the Ōtomo have through your support had their lands 
confirmed and received many benefits, a rare example of benevolence.37 However, recently, 
when Lord Yoshimitsu summoned you to the capital and you made that arduous journey, 
Ōtomo returned home without uttering a word of thanks to you. It is truly lamentable, not 
to mention rude and boorish. Even so, I beseech you to meet with him. He is still lodging at 
the port in Hyōgō. If I were to accompany you there and your relationship can be repaired, 
will he not be increasingly loyal?”
I replied: “I bear him no ill will, and my trip to the capital on account of Lord 
Yoshimitsu’s censure was only because he slew Ōtomo Ujisato.38 Ōtomo asked me 
for my honest opinion about traveling to the capital. As I had already set out, I sent a 
message saying that he too should come. When I arrived, Lord Yoshimitsu questioned me 
immediately, asking why Ōtomo considered me an enemy. I replied that I had no idea. I 
35 Hereditary lands were called bunkoku, allotments over which the lord had personal control, while delegated 
lands, over which the lord had been given administrative authority, were called chigyōkoku 知行国.
36 That is, Ryōshun’s service as Kyushu tandai.
37 Ōtomo Chikayo was Yoshihiro’s son-in-law and shugo of Bungo Province. Hasegawa 2008, p. 50, note 77.
38 The reason for Chikayo’s slaying of Ujisato is unclear, but according to Hasegawa, Chikayo sent Ujisato 
against Ryōshun as a sort of challenge to his authority as tandai. Additionally, Ujisato’s elder Ujinori 
collaborated with Ōuchi Yoshihiro, so perhaps there was some connection between Ujisato’s death and 
Yoshihiro’s attempts to smooth things over between him and Chikayo. Hasegawa 2008, p. 51.
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heard nothing from Chikayo even once he arrived in the capital. In spite of that, I still have 
not spoken ill of him to Lord Yoshimitsu. If you are saying that [Ōtomo] resents his errors 
and wants to meet with me, I have no intention of refusing. However, I have been ordered to 
depart immediately. Moreover, Lord Yoshimitsu gave me orders at length about Ōtomo—
I fear I would lose his confidence if I suggested a meeting with Ōtomo myself. At any rate, 
since you are acting as my intermediary, perhaps I should just meet with him; or perhaps I 
should discreetly obtain Lord Yoshimitsu’s permission first?”
Ōuchi replied: “That won’t do at all. Please go to Ōtomo yourself. According to your 
wishes I have twice submitted oaths to the effect that I would not support him. It should be 
no trouble [for you] to privately obtain forgiveness after the fact.” 39 To which I replied, “Well, 
that would mean I am to go against Yoshimitsu’s wishes.” Whereupon, Yoshihiro drew close 
to me and said: “It is well known that while the weak have done nothing wrong, Yoshimitsu 
mistrusts them and they lose face, while the strong are left alone despite going against his 
wishes. Even though you believe yourself safe because you are loyal and of the shogun’s line, 
if there comes a time when you are not in a position to defend yourself, may not something 
unexpectedly occur that will result in dishonor? For my part, I have received more provinces 
and estates than is fitting for my rank, so I must think of not losing them. If the three of 
us were to become allies there should be no censure—let alone punishment—regardless of 
what Yoshimitsu thinks. Recently having served in Kyoto and surveying the situation, [I 
can say] there is no need to be concerned about other daimyo or your family. If we can unite 
Kyushu and the provinces of the Chūgoku region, peace will extend to our children and 
grandchildren. After all, Ōtomo is a daimyo of Kyushu; if we were to unite beneath you, 
you would have no reason to fear. If you agree, I shall immediately write out an oath that 
binds us as allies for all time. This is why I wanted to repair the relationship with Ōtomo.”
I continued: “Your relationship with my younger brother Nakaaki is well-known.40 
Any mutual assistance between us goes without saying. Furthermore, sealing a formal 
alliance with you would cast undue suspicion on us, and turning against Lord Yoshimitsu 
[simply because of our past connection] is simply not something I can do.41 Nor can I 
have you risk the extirpation of your house on my account. However, why should you lose 
your provinces and estates if together we continue to serve Lord Yoshimitsu with greater 
devotion? In particular, you have recently received your orders concerning him, so any 
private settlement between us would be fruitless. If you would help Ōtomo, tell him that he 
should exercise caution and refrain from selfishness for the sake of the realm.” 42
Unfortunately, the recent events and those of Kyushu were entirely Ōuchi’s doing, 
as well as the reason behind my being dismissed [from the position of tandai]. Speaking 
39 This indicates thinking that prioritizes past service as a way of mitigating present mistakes. One who had 
committed a transgression in the present, but who had been loyal in the past, could expect leniency. Of 
course, one’s relation to one’s lord, in this case Ryōshun’s to Yoshimitsu, was an important factor, as well as 
one’s status and actual power.
40 Ryōshun’s younger brother Nakaaki was related by marriage to Yoshihiro.
41 Literally “Firing an arrow at His Lordship is not something I can allow myself [to do] (Kami o imōsu koto, 
gushin ni oite wa aru bekarazu 上を射申すこと、愚身に於いては有べからず).”
42 Ryōshun uses the word shikyoku 私曲, which means an action that is dishonest or unjust. In the context of 
the times, the first ideogram, also read shi or watakushi 私, had the connotation “private.” Ergo, here he is 
indicating an action that is personal, not public, in nature, and therefore of lesser importance. To concern 
oneself overly with private matters would have been seen as unprincipled.
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further on the matter, Lord Yoshimitsu’s intentions were entirely contrary to the folk of 
Kyushu’s expectations, so they suspected me of treachery and dishonesty, and shunned 
me. Even so, I thought that I could put Lord Yoshimitsu at ease over the matter of Kyushu 
if I could just go to the capital and clear everything up, but in the end he gave me no 
opportunity to defend myself. I imagine this was because those in Kyushu criticized me 
as unjust. Nevertheless, the truth always becomes known, and so everyone should know 
by now that Lord Yoshimitsu’s judgment was incorrect. Indeed, when it became clear that 
Ōuchi had marched on Izumi, Lord Yoshimitsu straightaway said to me: “Ōuchi has done 
just as you said. How shameful.” This is well known.
When one thinks about it, it might have been better had I acted without principle, 
morality, or justice when it suited me, for I have lost everything by being old-fashioned. 
Unfilial children; disloyal younger brothers; treacherous and unfaithful retainers; 
unprincipled and insolent followers, city folk, and farmers, each and every one prefers 
selfishness according to the occasion. This world is the same in all things. I write this that 
my descendants should all strive to be stalwart and humble. Show this to no one while I live.
Oh children, grandchildren! Though you think yourself clever,
You are yet inferior to your parents’ foolishness.
With humility,
The second month of the ninth year of Ōei,
Tokuō43
Postscript
Lord Motouji in Kamakura has the same name as my grandfather. It is said that taking the 
name of one without exceptional fame from among the members of a family is auspicious. 
Undoubtedly some among the Nitta have taken the name of Ashikaga ancestors for their 
own. This is why my father originally gave my eldest son the name Yoshinori.44 However, 
recently while in Kyushu I renamed him Sadatomi. This was most unfilial of me.
This year I have become ill unexpectedly, so my brush has begun to wander. Any mistakes 
or missing characters are due to old age. I can only beg the reader’s forgiveness for any errors.
Folks say that my departure from Kyushu was because I fell into the plots of two 
individuals—that of Ōuchi Yoshihiro, who desired the office of Kyushu tandai, or to that 
of Shiba Yoshimasa, who plotted to make Shibukawa Mitsuyori Kyushu tandai. How very 
clever, people said, that when peace came the position was given to a meritless relative 
[Shiba Yoshimasa] when Ryōshun was the one who went to great pains to subdue powerful 
enemies. Thinking about the matter of Bitchū Province, I am ashamed of Shibukawa’s 
actions.45 I shall speak no more of it.
43 Ryōshun’s retired name. He was seventy-eight at the time of writing in 1402.
44 Sadatomi was Ryōshun’s eldest son. Yoshinori is the name of Nitta Yoshihige’s son Yoshinori, who was the 
ancestor of the Yamana.
45 Mitsuyori was made to give up the shugo rights (shiki 職) of Bitchū Province in order to qualify for the 
position of Kyushu tandai. Shiba Yoshimasa then succeeded in having Mitsuyori, who was cousin to 
Yoshimitsu by marriage, as viceroy. Kawazoe 1964, pp. 212–13.
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